Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 62
Number 4 Human Rights in the American
Criminal Justice System (Summer 2018)

Article 12

2018

Drifting Away from Terrorism: Downward Departure from the
Terrorism Enhancement in Cases of Mental Illness
Melissa Powers
melissa.powers@slu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Melissa Powers, Drifting Away from Terrorism: Downward Departure from the Terrorism Enhancement in
Cases of Mental Illness, 62 St. Louis U. L.J. (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol62/iss4/12

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DRIFTING AWAY FROM TERRORISM: DOWNWARD DEPARTURE
FROM THE TERRORISM ENHANCEMENT IN CASES OF MENTAL
ILLNESS

INTRODUCTION
Without understating the gravity of the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers of
the World Trade Center, today, over fifteen years later, the threat of terrorism is
frequently overestimated. 1 Including 9/11, the probability of an American being
killed by a terrorist in the United States, is about one in four million per year. 2
Using only post-9/11 data, the probability changes to about one in ninety million
per year. 3 For perspective, an American’s chance of dying in a car crash is about
one in 8,000 a year, the chance of being murdered is about one in 22,000, and
the chance of being killed by a deer is one in two million. 4 Regardless of these
statistics, roughly forty percent of the public claim that they worry that either
they or a family member will become a terrorist victim. 5
Granted, many Americans may not be aware of the probability of all these
events. However, even if they were aware, there is psychological research which
explains why the risks of unlikely but frightening events are often overestimated.
Maia Szalavitz, a neuroscience journalist, writes that: “Because fear strengthens
memory, catastrophes such as earthquakes, plane crashes, and terrorist incidents
completely capture our attention. As a result, we overestimate the odds of
dreadful but infrequent events and underestimate how risky ordinary events
are.” 6 Szalavitz notes that the drama and repetition of news coverage of
improbable events make them seem more common, 7 thus increasing the
perceived risk and its associated fear. When public fears increase, there is a risk

1. See John Mueller, Getting Real on the Terrorism Threat to the United States, WAR ON THE
ROCKS (Aug. 23, 2016), https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/getting-real-on-the-terrorism-threatto-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/S3QS-JNGT]; see also John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart,
American Public Opinion on Terrorism Since 9/11: Trends and Puzzles, Presentation at the Nat’l
Convention of the Int’l Studies Ass’n 1 (Mar. 8, 2016), http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmuel
ler/tpoISA16.pdf [https://perma.cc/98NR-H62T].
2. Mueller & Stewart, supra note 1, at 5.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 56.
5. See id. at 6.
6. Maia Szalavitz, 10 Ways We Get the Odds Wrong, PSYCHOL. TODAY (updated June 9,
2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200801/10-ways-we-get-the-odds-wrong
[https://perma.cc/CGH5-LHQB].
7. See id.
939
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of falling “victim to the politics of fear,” 8 which may result in irresponsible
policymaking. When fears remain at high levels, even over fifteen years after a
traumatic event, then there is an even greater risk: continued irresponsible
policymaking. 9
As John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart write: “9/11 clearly has achieved
perpetual resonance in the American mind.” 10 As a result, Mueller and Stewart
contend, the American public suffers from “long-term, routinized, mass anxiety”
causing them to live in a false sense of insecurity. 11 Because the threat of
terrorism cannot be entirely eliminated and because terrorism has a “special
formlessness” and volatility that makes this threat difficult to define, “it may be
exceptionally difficult to get people to believe that the threat has really been
extinguished—or at least is no longer particularly significant.” 12
With that difficulty comes more problems, particularly the risk that the
inability to define terrorism will lead to a vague, over-encompassing definition
whose application brings non-traditional terrorism offenders under the
“terrorism” umbrella. It has already been seen with environmental activists
being labeled “eco-terrorists” 13 and now it can be seen with offenders suffering
from mental illness. 14
This Article argues that mental illness should be a required factor to consider
during sentencing when applying the Terrorism Enhancement, and if a defendant
suffering from mental illness is found to have been a “vulnerable victim” of
another in committing the offense, there should be downward departure. Part I
discusses the historical background of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(“Guidelines”) and how they have evolved to their current form. Part II discusses
the enactment of the Terrorism Enhancement, how it changed after 9/11, and the
specifics of its application as part of such Guidelines. Part III analyzes the use
of the Guidelines, including common critiques of the Guidelines and

8. AVIVA STAHL, CAGEPRISONERS, TOO BLUNT FOR JUST OUTCOMES: WHY THE U.S.
TERRORISM ENHANCEMENT SENTENCING GUIDELINES ARE UNFAIR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND
INEFFECTIVE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 5 (2016), https://cage.ngo/wp-content/uploads/
cp_too_blunt_for_just_outcomes.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL6H-TL5Y].
9. See John Mueller, Getting Real on the Terrorism Threat to the United States, WAR ON THE
ROCKS, (Aug. 23, 2016), https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/getting-real-on-the-terrorism-threatto-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/3EE8-YXCJ].
10. Mueller & Stewart, supra note 1, at 1.
11. Id. at 1–2.
12. Id. at 1.
13. See Shane Harris, The Terrorism Enhancement: An Obscure Law Stretches the Definition
of Terrorism, and Metes Out Severe Punishments, NAT’L J., July 13, 2007, http://shaneharris.com/
magazinestories/terrorism-enhancement-obscure-law-stretches-the-definition-of-terrorism-andmetes-out-severe-punishments/ [https://perma.cc/TT3B-A8LJ].
14. See Nicole Hong, Terror Case Highlights Mental-Health Issues Among Suspected ISIS
Recruits, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/terror-case-highlights-men
tal-health-issues-among-suspected-isis-recruits-1473270174 [https://perma.cc/97HT-3FDR].
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specifically, the Terrorism Enhancement, and identifies provisions for departure.
Part III highlights a case with model sentencing dealing with the Terrorism
Enhancement and a defendant with mental illness. Lastly, Part IV argues for
required consideration of a defendant’s mental illness and more relaxed
treatment in sentencing for defendants with mental illness identified as a
“vulnerable victim” to another in committing the offense.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A.

Procedure

Procedurally, federal sentencing is a multi-step process with many elements
at play. First, all federal crimes are grouped according to general offense
characteristics and then assigned a base offense level, which serves as a starting
point for determining the seriousness, and coinciding sentence, of a particular
offense. 15 The guidelines provide forty-three levels of offense seriousness, with
higher offense levels indicating more serious crimes. 16 The sentences range from
zero-to-six months to life. 17 The forty-three levels are broken into four uneven
zones, Zone A through Zone D, with Zone D encompassing the most serious
offenses. 18
In determining a sentence, the Guidelines take into account both the
seriousness of an offense and the characteristics of the offender, including
criminal history. 19 A base level may change depending on “specific offense
characteristics.” 20 Specific offense characteristics are offense-dependent factors
that can increase or decrease a base offense level. 21 For example, using a firearm
during a robbery is an enhancement characteristic that brings along a five-level
increase, and if that firearm was discharged during a robbery, it carries a sevenlevel increase. 22 Additionally, “adjustments” may increase or decrease a base
level. 23 Unlike specific offense characteristics, adjustments are not offensespecific; they can apply to any offense. 24

15. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
1 (2016) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW], http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEK7AMEV].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
20. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW, supra note 15.
21. Id. at 1.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id.
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After any addition or subtraction from specific offense characteristics and/or
adjustments, the final offense level is determined and it is aligned with the
criminal history of an offender to determine the offender’s sentencing guideline
range. 25 There are six criminal history categories, with the sixth, Category VI,
being the most serious and including offenders with serious criminal records. 26
The sentencing guideline range is listed by months of imprisonment. 27
Once this range is determined, the court may depart downward or upward
from the range if aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist. 28 If a judge
chooses to depart, he or she must state in writing the reason for doing so. 29
B.

Inception

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 30 played an important role for federal
sentencing. Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, judges had “nearly unfettered”
discretion in sentencing and the system was critiqued as “lawless.” 31 In
response, Congress sought to add more structure to the sentencing system. 32
Among other things, the Sentencing Reform Act created the U.S. Sentencing
Commission (“Commission”), which is an independent agency within the
Judicial Branch. 33 The general purpose of the Commission is to establish
sentencing guidelines for the federal criminal justice system. 34 In doing so, the
Commission’s specific purpose is to (1) provide certainty and fairness while
meeting the purposes of sentencing, 35 (2) avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities among similar defendants, (3) maintain flexibility to permit
individualized sentences, and (4) reflect, to a reasonable extent, advancement in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process. 36 The
creation of the Commission “rested on Congressional awareness that sentencing
is a dynamic field that requires continuing review by an expert body to revise

25. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW, supra note 15, at 2.
26. Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
27. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW, supra note 15.
28. Id.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW, supra note 15.
30. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987.
31. John M. Walker, Jr., Loosening the Administrative Handcuffs: Discretion and
Responsibility Under the Guidelines, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 551 (1993).
32. Id.
33. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.1(1).
35. Generally speaking, the primary purposes of sentencing are to punish criminals and
prevent crimes. Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 10
(2006). Beyond that, sentencing has many other specific purposes, including denunciation of
wrongful behavior, reinforcement of basic social norms, promoting respect for the law, protecting
the public from further crimes, and to provide an offender with effective correctional treatment.
See id. at 13. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2012).
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sentencing policies, in light of application experience, as new criminal statutes
are enacted, and as more is learned about what motivates and controls criminal
behavior.” 37
Even at the outset of the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress recognized that
it would be unmanageable for the Commission to anticipate every possible
relevant circumstance for sentencing in any case and then provide for them in
general, rule-based guidelines. 38 As such, it laid out what a court must consider
in sentencing while giving courts an opportunity to consider other extenuating
factors. Section 3553(a) explains that:
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and characteristics of the
defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote the respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established…;
(5) any pertinent policy statement…;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 39

Under 28 U.S.C. § 994(d), in establishing categories of defendants for use
in the Guidelines, the Commission considers whether the following matters,
with respect to a defendant, have any relevance to the nature or extent of an
appropriate sentence. 40 If any are relevant, the Commission shall take them into
account, but only to the extent that they have relevance. 41 These matters, in
relevant part, include: “(4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that
such condition mitigates the defendant’s culpability or to the extent that such
condition is otherwise plainly relevant . . . . ; (9) role in the offense; and (10)

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2.
Id. § 1A.1(4)(c).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (emphasis added).
28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012).
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

944

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:939

criminal history . . . .” 42 In regard to race, sex, national origin, creed, and
socioeconomic status, the Commission and its promulgated Guidelines must
remain “entirely neutral.” 43
Additionally, Congress included a provision in the Sentencing Reform Act
which said that courts may depart from the Guidelines if an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance exists, either in kind or degree, that the Commission did
not adequately consider and should result in a different sentence. 44 The original
Commission intended courts to view the Guidelines as carving out a “heartland”
of typical cases which embody the conduct specific to each guideline.45 When a
court is faced with an atypical case—where a particular guideline linguistically
applies but the case-specific conduct significantly differs from the norm of the
“heartland” cases—the court may consider whether a departure is warranted. 46
The Guidelines specifically provide that mental and emotional conditions
may be relevant factors justifying departure. 47 Such conditions may be relevant
if, they “individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, are
present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases
covered by the [G]uidelines.” 48 Additionally, a court may depart if it determines
that a circumstance, although already taken into consideration in determining
the sentencing range, is present to a degree substantially in excess of or below
the typical amount for that kind of offense. 49 Although the Guidelines provide
specific guidance for departures in certain circumstances, departure on grounds
not mentioned in the Guidelines also is permitted. 50
C. Evolution
1.

United States v. Booker

In the 2005 case, United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court struck down
the then-mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines, instead making them
advisory. 51 As originally written, the Guidelines were binding on all judges. 52
Before Booker, courts held that the Guidelines were mandatory, thus limiting

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 15, at 3.
45. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.1(4)(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2016).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 5H1.3.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 5K2.0(a)(3).
50. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.4(b).
51. 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
52. Id. at 233. The Court in Booker wrote, “[w]e do not doubt that Congress, when it wrote
the Sentencing Act, intended to create a form of mandatory Guidelines system.” Id. at 266.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2018]

DRIFTING AWAY FROM TERRORISM

945

the severity of a sentence that a judge could lawfully impose. 53 Even though in
their original form the Guidelines permitted departures from a prescribed
sentencing range, in Booker, the Court found that, “[i]n most cases, as a matter
of law, the Commission will have adequately taken all relevant factors into
account, and no departure will be legally permissible.” 54 The Commission itself
even believed, “that despite the courts’ legal freedom to depart from the
[G]uidelines, they will not do so very often.” 55
In finding the ability to depart from the Guidelines limited in opportunity,
Booker examined whether mandatory sentencing guidelines violated a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 56 The Court recognized that
the Guidelines’ systematic application brought efficiency and expediency, but it
noted that such systemic application was at the cost of a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights. 57 If mandatory, the sentencing scheme would interfere with
a defendant’s right to a jury trial because a judge could impose a sentence that
is not solely based on jury-found facts or those the defendant admits. 58
Further, Booker concluded that although Congress intended the Guidelines
to be mandatory, it would have preferred a system that was not mandatory over
a system that simply consisted of similar sentences for those convicted of
violation of the same statute. 59 The Court explained that the uniformity that
Congress aimed for in passing the Federal Sentencing Act was not merely in
similar sentences for those convicted of violations of the same statute, but rather
should emanate with similar relationships between sentences and real conduct. 60
Under Booker, since the Guidelines became advisory, a court is not bound
to apply them even though it still must consult the Guidelines and take them into
account. 61 This has given courts more discretion to depart from the previously
mandatory Guidelines. However, while courts have the ability to depart from the
Guidelines, in doing so, they also depart from the uniformity and ease that comes
from a straightforward, almost mathematical, application of the Guidelines,
instead vying with the grey cloud that hovers above discretion. This discretion
is not unchecked; an appellate court can review a trial court’s departure from the
Guidelines, thereby subjecting it to a review for unreasonableness. 62
The Booker Court found that because a trial court must still consult the
Guidelines and its decision is subject to a review for unreasonableness, the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 226.
Id. at 234.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.4(b).
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 253–54.
Id.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
Id. at 264.
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Guidelines, while lacking the mandatory status as enacted, still furthered the
objectives that Congress originally intended. 63 The Court wrote that these two
checks “continue to move sentencing in Congress’ preferred direction, helping
to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient
to individualize sentences where necessary.” 64 The Commission itself has noted
a similar rationale, saying that an advisory Guidelines system continues to
ensure transparency and to promote certainty and predictability in sentencing,
which enables parties to better anticipate a likely sentence. 65
In the wake of Booker, before any further interpretation, 66 chaos ensued in
the courtroom—both at trial and appellate levels. 67 At the trial level, judges once
again could utilize their judicial discretion to either follow the Guidelines to
enhance the goals of uniformity and fairness or to opt for a more nuanced
approach, pushing toward the creation of a “common law of sentencing.” 68
At the appellate level, Booker created uncertainty about the respective roles
of appellate and trial courts. 69 Because the trial courts now possessed greater
discretion, albeit not completely unfettered, the role of appellate review had the
potential to decrease significantly. Therefore, it was left to the Supreme Court
in post-Booker cases to more precisely carve out the role for appellate review.
2.

Supreme Court Cases Post-Booker: 2007

After Booker, in a trio of 2007 cases, the Supreme Court continued to stress
the importance of considering the Guidelines, while maintaining the position
that the Guidelines were not mandatory. Rita v. United States explained that a
district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating
the applicable Guidelines range. 70 Additionally, in Rita, the Court held that an
appellate court may apply a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing a
district court sentence which “reflects a proper application of the Sentencing
Guidelines.” 71
In Kimbrough v. United States, the Court concluded that a judge “must
include the Guidelines range in the array of factors warranting consideration.” 72
However, Kimbrough maintained the advisory notion of the Guidelines in saying

63. Id.
64. Id. at 264–65.
65. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
66. See supra Section I.C.2.
67. George D. Brown, Notes on a Terrorism Trial: Preventive Prosecution, “Material
Support” and the Role of the Judge After United States v. Mehanna, 4 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J.
1, 45 (2012).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
71. Id.
72. 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007).
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that a “judge may determine whether, in a particular case, a within-Guidelines
sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the objectives of sentencing.” 73
Gall v. United States explained, “[T]o secure nationwide consistency, the
Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.” 74 Gall also
held that the district judge should consider all of the statutory factors of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine if a sentence is supported. 75 Gall further explained
that a district court should not presume that the sentencing range from the
Guidelines is reasonable. 76 Rather, a district court judge must make an
“individualized assessment based on the facts presented.” 77 After doing so, a
judge can sentence outside the Guidelines, but must consider the “extent of the
deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support
the degree of variance.” 78 The Court found it “uncontroversial” that the larger
the departure from the Guidelines, the more support needed to justify it. 79
Gall specifically showed strong support for the importance of the
Guidelines, while keeping them advisory. In discussing an appellate court’s
review, Gall held that a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the sentencing
court committed such errors as “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” 80 If the appellate court finds
the district court’s sentencing decision to be procedurally sound, then it
considers the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. 81
Although it is well-recognized that the Guidelines are advisory, post-Booker
cases have maintained the significant influence of the Guidelines, both in
sentencing at the trial level and at the appellate level. 82 The fact that a trial judge
must begin the sentencing process with the Guidelines and an appellate judge
can declare a sentence procedurally unsound based on Guidelines calculations
illustrates mandatory-like characteristics. However, there are advisory-like
characteristics to offset these, such as an appellate judge’s ability to declare a
sentence procedurally unsound if a trial judge treats the Guidelines as
mandatory. Overall, the Guidelines have sustained a position as well-regarded

73. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)).
74. 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
75. Id. at 49–50.
76. Id. at 50.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 (2007).
80. Id. at 51.
81. Id.
82. George D. Brown, Punishing Terrorists: Congress, the Sentencing Commission, the
Guidelines, and the Courts, 23 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 529 (2014).
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and play a key role in sentencing, while remaining advisory. The sentencing
system appears to be in a cloudy, substantial state of flux. 83
II. CONTINUING ON POST-BOOKER: FOLLOW-UP AFTER 2007
In 2013, Peugh v. United States 84 continued to push back on the advisory
nature of the Guidelines, swinging toward the viewpoint of the Guidelines as
mandatory in nature. 85 Although support for mandatory Guidelines was not
directly on the face of the case, 86 the Peugh decision supported the view that the
Guidelines are very close to law, and it enhanced the already significant role that
they play. 87 It elevated the pro-mandatory theme illustrated in the trio of postBooker Supreme Court cases from 2007. 88 In summarizing the post-Booker era,
the Court in Peugh wrote that: “The post-Booker federal sentencing scheme aims
to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the
Guidelines and that they remain a meaningful benchmark through the process of
appellate review.” 89
The Peugh Court highlighted the vital role of the Guidelines, downplaying
their advisory status. 90 Peugh held that since previous opinions established a
district court must begin sentencing by correctly calculating the applicable
guidelines range, 91 even if the eventual sentence varies from the Guidelines, the
Guidelines are “in a real sense the basis for the sentence” because they were
used from the outset. 92 Even though a district court can ultimately sentence a
defendant outside the Guidelines range, this does not deprive the Guidelines of
their role as the primary force behind the framework for sentencing. 93
Additionally, the Court in Peugh noted that the appellate review for
reasonableness continues to use the Guidelines as a benchmark in order to
promote uniformity and “iron out sentencing differences.” 94
In Peugh, Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, highlighted the
background for the Guidelines in saying that: “The Commission produced the
now familiar Sentencing Guidelines: a system under which a set of inputs

83. Id.
84. 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013).
85. Brown, supra note 82, at 531.
86. In fact, the Court notes that treating the Guidelines as mandatory is a procedural error.
Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2080.
87. Brown, supra note 82, at 529 (quotations omitted).
88. Id. at 532.
89. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083.
90. Id.
91. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
92. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083 (emphasis added) (quoting Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S.
522, 529 (2011)).
93. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083.
94. Id. (quoting Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005)).
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specific to a given case (the particular characteristics of the offense and offender)
yielded a predetermined output (a range of months within which the defendant
could be sentenced).” 95 The Guidelines are categorized as a relatively simple
mathematical equation with inputs and outputs. While the Court in Peugh noted
that the particular characteristics of an offense and offender are inputs, the output
is described as “predetermined,” 96 because the inputs of particular
characteristics of offenses and offenders come from the Guidelines themselves,
which, by nature, cannot account for all possible applicable particular
characteristics unique to the defendant or the circumstances of the offense. 97
Overall, Peugh supported the notion that the Guidelines represent an
“authoritative view of the appropriate sentences for specifics crimes” 98 and that
the federal sentencing system itself implements measures intended to make the
Guidelines the “lodestone of sentencing.” 99 Between Peugh and the other postBooker cases, the proposition that the Guidelines are “advisory” in nature
appears questionable.
III. THE TERRORISM ENHANCEMENT
A.

Original Enactment

In the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress
instructed the Commission to “amend its sentencing guidelines to provide an
appropriate enhancement for any felony, whether committed within or outside
the United States, that involves or is intended to promote international terrorism,
unless such involvement or intent is itself an element of the crime.” 100 In
response, the Commission enacted § 3A1.4 of the Guidelines. 101
Section 3A1.4, known as the Terrorism Enhancement, is a sentencing
enhancement which applies if “the offense is a felony that involved, or was
intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.” 102 A federal crime of
terrorism is defined in two parts. 103 First, the definition requires an offense that
is “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of the government by
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.” 104 Second,

95. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2079.
96. Id.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
98. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2085.
99. Id. at 2084.
100. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120004,
108 Stat. 1796, 2022.
101. Wadie E. Said, Sentencing Terrorist Crimes, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 477, 499 (2014).
102. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (2012).
104. Id.
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the offense must be a violation of at least one of a lengthy list of specifically
enumerated statutes. 105
B.

The Patriot Act Amendment

Upon passing the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
(“Patriot Act”), Congress authorized a noteworthy amendment to § 3A1.4. 106
Under the Patriot Act amendment, the Terrorism Enhancement became
applicable to crimes that involved terrorism, but otherwise did not fall within the
federal crime of terrorism definition. 107 As a result, even if an offense is not
listed in the second part of the definition of a federal crime of terrorism under §
2332b(g)(5)(B), the defendant can still be subject to the Terrorism Enhancement
so long as “the offense was calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government
conduct.” 108 Essentially, the amendment made it possible for the Terrorism
Enhancement to apply to any criminal act so long as the requisite intent was
present.
Even more so, the Patriot Act amendment stretched the Terrorism
Enhancement to encompass more crimes. Following the Patriot Act amendment,
the Terrorism Enhancement covered offenses from the list of offenses under §
2332b(g)(5)(B) although such offenses are not calculated to influence or affect
the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against
government conduct, but rather are calculated to, “intimidate or coerce a civilian
population.” 109
C. Applying the Terrorism Enhancement
If a court applies the § 3A1.4 Terrorism Enhancement, the minimum
sentencing range a convicted defendant would face is 210–262 months, which
is the Guidelines’ sentencing table calculation for a Level 32 offense with a
Category VI criminal history. 110 To visualize, consider this: after the Terrorism
Enhancement is applied, the sentencing range for a Level 12 base offense jumps
from ten–sixteen months (at most a little over a year) to 210–262 months (at
most almost twenty-two years). 111 Although the Booker decision categorizes the
Guidelines as advisory and therefore provides the courts with the potential to
blunt the sharp effect of a § 3A1.4 enhancement, the sentencing still remains

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.; see also Said, supra note 101, at 499.
Said, supra note 101, at 500.
Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 cmt. n.4.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 cmt. n. 4.
Id. (emphasis added).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A.
Id.
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subject to the discretion of district court judges 112 and Supreme Court trends,
which uphold strong support for the Guidelines. 113
If the Terrorism Enhancement under § 3A1.4 applies, the convicted
defendant’s sentencing level is subject to a twelve level enhancement and if,
after such enhancement, the resulting offense level is less than thirty-two, it is
automatically adjusted upward to Level 32. 114 In other words, if an offender’s
crime is initially a base offense level less than 20, then, in applying the Terrorism
Enhancement, the offense level is immediately increased to Level 32; if the
offender’s crime has a base level at or above 20, twelve levels are added. 115
Although it is possible for this calculation to result in less than a life sentence,
practically speaking, the application of the Terrorism Enhancement is likely to
result in life imprisonment. 116
Additionally, under the Terrorism Enhancement, the defendant’s criminal
history is automatically a Category VI, the highest category, regardless of the
defendant’s actual criminal history. 117 Ironically, in making the Guidelines, the
Commission must take criminal history into account, to the extent it is
relevant, 118 but, in applying the Terrorism Enhancement, since criminal history
is automatically Category VI, criminal history cannot be a factor at all for a
sentencing judge, regardless of its relevancy.
IV. ANALYZING THE USE OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A.

Evaluating Both Sides of the Guidelines

From the outset, critics have described the Guidelines as “administrative
handcuffs” for judges. 119 Before the introduction of the Guidelines, sentencing
lacked uniformity. The Guidelines aspired to create uniformity and eradicate the
effects of “discrimination, judicial idiosyncrasies, and biases in order to promote
fairness and justice.” 120 Although aimed at uniformity, the Guidelines have been
criticized as taking “away the human element from the sentencing process,” and
instead inserting “clean, sharp edges of a sentencing slide rule.” 121 The
Guidelines, while aimed at the valiant goal of uniformity in sentencing, have

112. Said, supra note 101, at 501.
113. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2084.
114. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4.
115. STAHL, supra note 8, at 9.
116. Brown, supra note 67, at 48.
117. STAHL, supra note 8, at 9.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012).
119. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on
the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1697 (1992).
120. Rachael A. Hill, Character, Choice, and “Aberrant Behavior”: Aligning Criminal
Sentencing with Concepts or Moral Blame, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 975, 975 (1998).
121. Walker, Jr., supra note 31, at 552.
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seemed to overstep their bounds into tight rigidity, giving similar sentences to
cases with important distinctions. 122 The legal norms that the Guidelines purport
to implement cannot, and do not, perfectly represent moral intuitions because,
by their very nature, moral intuitions vary according to facts and
circumstances. 123 Therefore, the Guidelines can inherently result in sentences
more severe than society’s moral intuitions call for in certain situations. 124
“Critics contend that the Guidelines virtually abolish consideration of the
defendant’s character and, instead, require judges to sentence based largely upon
the offense rather than the offender.” 125 On the other hand, supporters maintain
that some elimination of a defendant’s personal characteristics—such as race
and economic status—contribute to making the Guidelines fair. 126 Remaining
neutral toward these characteristics helps to limit sentencing disparities. 127 In
initially creating the Guidelines, the Commission sought to narrow judges’
discretion and “eliminate the disparities in sentencing that seemed to plague
federal courts.” 128 While a plaguing amount of disparities in sentencing can
certainly pose an issue, the Guidelines have caused judges and prosecutors to
lose their ability to effectuate justice in individual cases due to their “allegiance
to rigid rules.” 129 Overall, the Guidelines aimed to meet aspirational goals;
however, in attempting to do so, they contemporaneously created many
additional problems which judges grapple with today.
B.

Critiquing the Application of the Terrorism Enhancement

Many elements of the Terrorism Enhancement create reason for alarm. It is
well noted, and in fact fundamental to the purpose of an enhancement in general,
that it can drastically increase a sentence. Over seven percent of terrorism cases
result in life sentences, which is three times the rate of generic criminal cases. 130
The automatic Category VI criminal history plays an important role in the
resulting high sentences. Since criminal history is automatically Category VI, an
offender’s actual criminal history cannot be a factor at all, regardless of

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Hill, supra note 120, at 975.
Id. at 977–81.
Id. at 975.
Walker, Jr., supra note 31, at 558.
28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012); Ken LaMance, Advantages of Federal Sentencing,
LEGALMATCH L. LIBRARY (July 8, 2015), http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/advan
tages-of-federal-sentencing-guidelines.html [https://perma.cc/B26Q-NUMH].
127. LaMance, supra note 126.
128. STAHL, supra note 8, at 7.
129. Freed, supra note 119, at 1684.
130. Joanna Baltes et al., Convicted Terrorists: Sentencing Considerations and Their Policy
Implications, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 347, 356 (2016).
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relevancy, for a sentencing judge. 131 Offenders without a criminal history must
suddenly be credited with one.
Judges have found the criminal history impact of the Terrorism
Enhancement troublesome. For example, Judge George O’Toole, a U.S. District
Court Judge for the District of Massachusetts, was concerned about the
unfairness of the predetermined criminal history. 132 Judge O’Toole expressed
his concern saying that, “the automatic assignment of the defendant to a
Criminal History Category VI . . . is not only too blunt an instrument to have
genuine analytical value, it is fundamentally at odds with the design of the
Guidelines. It can, as it does in this case, import a fiction into the calculus.” 133
As a result, Judge O’Toole chose to disregard the Terrorism Enhancement in
sentencing. 134 Similarly, Judge Daniel Crabtree, a U.S. District Court Judge for
the District of Kansas, has found the automatic criminal history element of the
Terrorism Enhancement to be unsettling, especially for offenders without any
prior criminal history. 135 Beyond that, Judge Clay D. Land, a U.S. District Court
Judge for the Middle District of Georgia, observed that a three category increase
from the offender’s actual Category III criminal history to Category VI was still
worrisome. 136 Judge Land found that the automatic increase under the Terrorism
Enhancement “ignores the individual ‘history and characteristics’ of the
Defendant, and instead places too much weight on a questionable interpretation
of what constitutes a federal crime of terrorism under the Guidelines.” 137 As
such, he opted not to apply the Terrorism Enhancement because he could not
justify its application, instead finding it “excessive.” 138
In summary, the Terrorism Enhancement reflects Congress’s effort to
accurately compensate for the severity that society associates with terrorism. 139
However, this “one size fits all” approach, which grants one criminal history to
all offenders, risks backlash from judges who choose to refuse to consider the
Terrorism Enhancement because it is too severe. 140 While some judges
recognize the propensity for the automatic criminal history to create overly harsh
sentences and take measures to avoid such a result, not all judges may feel this
way or even feel willing to disagree with the Guidelines, although it is in their
131. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012).
132. Baltes et al., supra note 130, at 356 (citing United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (1st
Cir. 2013)).
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. Brown, supra note 67, at 5 (citing Transcript of Disposition at 69, United States v.
Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (D. Mass. 2012), No. 09—cr-10017-GAO). The Circuit Court affirmed
Judge O’Toole’s holding. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 69.
135. See infra notes 217–19.
136. United States v. Garey, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1379 (M.D. Ga. 2005).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1380.
139. Brown, supra note 67, at 8.
140. Id.
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power to do so. There is a risk that judges will feel obligated to apply the
Terrorism Enhancement anyways or decide that the problematic nature of the
criminal history element is not enough to disregard the Terrorism Enhancement
all together.
Additionally, critics contend that the use of the automatic Category VI
criminal history undermines the fundamental purposes for which the Guidelines
were established in the first place: fairness and equality. 141 Without recognizing
an offender’s actual criminal history and instead imputing a level of criminality,
an offender with a serious criminal history is treated the same as one with a clean
past. It is unfair that someone who has managed to stay out of trouble is treated
the same as someone who has not only failed to do so, but has failed multiple
times to do so. Also, as a result of the automatic criminal history component of
the Terrorism Enhancement, criminal history is not given equal opportunity for
consideration in sentencing. In some contexts, such as diminished capacity, the
seriousness of a defendant’s criminal history can prohibit a judge from
departure. 142 Therefore, a serious actual criminal history can hurt an offender,
however, in the context of the Terrorism Enhancement, a less serious, sometimes
non-existent, criminal history cannot help an offender.
Critics of the Terrorism Enhancement also fear that consistent application
would essentially create a mandatory minimum sentence for terrorism
offenses, 143 of which there are many, with some not even statutorily terrorism
but still falling under the purview of the Terrorism Enhancement. 144
Mathematically, the combination of a high base offense level (Level 32) and the
highest criminal history category (Category VI) ensures this minimum sentence
result. 145 In response, legal scholars have described the Terrorism Enhancement
as “draconian” and as a cause of disproportionate sentencing because it treats a
wide range of crimes alike. 146 In doing so, the Terrorism Enhancement
compromises the “gradation of offenses” in that a terrorist is a terrorist
regardless of the underlying crime. 147 Essentially, it takes away the ability to
differentiate among terrorists who commit different crimes. 148

141. STAHL, supra note 8, at 16.
142. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016);
infra Section III.C.2.
143. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A; Brown, Punishing Terrorists, supra note
82, at 533.
144. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 cmt. n.4; Said, supra note 101, at 499.
145. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A; Brown, Punishing Terrorists, supra note
82, at 533.
146. Brown, Notes on a Terrorism Trial, supra note 67, at 48 (citing James P. McLaughlin,
Deconstructing United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 3A1.4: Sentencing Failure in Cases
of Financial Support for Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 28 L. & INEQ. 51, 51, 54 (2010)).
147. Id. at 54.
148. Id.
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More critiques arise beyond the Terrorism Enhancement’s automatic
criminal history feature and its potential for a high mandatory minimum
sentence, both of which contribute to its ability to drastically increase a sentence.
For one, as a result of the Patriot Act amendment, sentencing judges can apply
the Terrorism Enhancement even if a defendant was not convicted of a terrorism
act per se. 149 Thus, judges maintain wide-ranging power and expanded
discretion in sentencing because even if a defendant cannot be linked to a
specific act of terrorism, the Terrorism Enhancement and its heightened sentence
can still apply. 150
With that, the already vague and broad definition of a “federal crime of
terrorism” became vaguer and far more expansive. Congress attempted to turn
terrorism into a legal term “operationalized through precise legal provisions,”
but in doing so, it may have taken on a near impossible challenge because no
consensus on the definition of terrorism exists. 151 In defining “federal crime of
terrorism” in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), Congress chose its own challenge,
and instead of truly identifying what it sought to punish, Congress opted to
vaguely seek “tougher sentences for a range of existing crimes when they were
motivated by terrorist impulses.” 152
Critics have also observed that the Terrorism Enhancement has problematic
purposes behind its problematic effects. 153 It has been noted that the drastically
enhanced sentences in terrorism cases are problematic because they are often
used to send overly harsh messages, more so than the deterrence message
illustrated in typical criminal cases. 154 Additionally, critics of the Terrorism
Enhancement have discerned that it can be used as a “bargaining chip” to strongarm a desired result. 155 At times, the government will recommend a reduced
sentence because of cooperation, and at other times, if a defendant defaulted on
his/her agreement to cooperate, then the government chooses to seek the
Terrorism Enhancement. 156 Such a use poses a major issue because in
determining who is and who is not treated as a terrorist, policy and principle may
not always be at the forefront of the government’s decision. 157 The government’s
motive behind such use of the Terrorism Enhancement does not squarely aim to

149. Harris, supra note 13.
150. STAHL, supra note 8, at 10.
151. Michael Buchhandler-Raphael, What’s Terrorism Got to Do with It? The Perils of
Prosecutorial Misuses of Terrorism Offenses, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 807, 813 (2012).
152. Harris, supra note 13.
153. Baltes et al., supra note 130, at 358; Harris, supra note 13.
154. Baltes et al., supra note 130, at 358.
155. Harris, supra note 13.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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punish terrorism, 158 it puts conditions on doing so and, at times, is punishing a
lack of cooperation more so than punishing terrorism.
C. Accounting for Vulnerability and Mental Condition in the Guidelines
Knowing that the rules provided for in the Guidelines could not possibly
account for every situation, the Guidelines were supplemented with potential
deviations from explicit sentences and the judicial discretion to execute them. 159
As such, it is evident that the Guidelines, alongside its quest for uniformity,
sought to accomplish more than punishment for criminal conduct. 160 Numerous
provisions of the Guidelines account for vulnerability, mental capacity,
blameworthiness, and mental and emotional conditions.
1.

The Vulnerable Victim Enhancement

The Terrorism Enhancement of § 3A1.4 is not the only enhancement of the
sentencing guidelines; it is one of many. Under § 3A1.1, another enhancement,
known as the Vulnerable Victim Enhancement, allows for a two-level increase
in an offense level if a defendant “knew or should have known that a victim of
the offense was a vulnerable victim.” 161 Under the enhancement, “vulnerable
victim” is defined as a person “who is a victim of the offense of conviction and
any conduct for which the defendant is accountable,” and who is “unusually
vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise
particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” 162 However, there is nothing
in the Guidelines that specifically calls for the downward departure or reduction
in sentence for offenders who are “unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or
mental condition, or . . . otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal
conduct” and are not the main perpetrator of an offense. 163
2.

Diminished Capacity

Another circumstance for which the Guidelines warrant deviance from the
base level sentencing is for diminished capacity. 164 The Guidelines provide that
“a downward departure may be warranted if (1) the defendant committed the
offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity; and (2) the
significantly reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the
commission of the offense.” 165 The Guidelines define “significantly reduced

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Hill, supra note 120, at 980.
Id.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
Id. § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2.
Id.
Id. § 5K2.13.
Id.
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mental capacity” to mean that a defendant has a “significantly impaired ability
to (A) understand the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense or to
exercise the power of reason; or (B) control behavior that the defendant knows
is wrongful.” 166 If a judge finds that a departure is warranted for diminished
capacity, the extent of the departure should reflect the degree to which the
reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense. 167
The four exceptions 168 for downward departure for diminished capacity
preclude departure in many cases, and, within the limited number of cases where
departure is not precluded by such limitations, trial courts have not often
departed downward. 169 Moreover, some courts have maintained that considering
the diminished capacity departure is evidence that the Commission has
adequately considered circumstances for downward departure relating to mental
conditions, and thus disqualifying mental conditions from consideration for
departure under § 5K2.0 of the Guidelines. 170 Such a holding raises the concern
that mental conditions will not receive adequate consideration on their own
without being linked to an explicit provision of the Guidelines which account
for them, such as the provision for diminished capacity.
3.

Aberrant Behavior

The Guidelines also allow for departure in cases of aberrant behavior. 171 In
order to qualify for the departure for aberrant behavior, a defendant must have
committed a single criminal offense that “(1) was committed without significant
planning; (2) was of limited duration; and (3) represents a marked deviation by
the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding life.” 172 The aberrant behavior
departure does not apply to certain named offenses. 173 It also does not apply if

166. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13. cmt. n.1.
167. Id. § 5K2.13.
168. Id.
169. Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Downward Departure Under § 5K2.13 of United
States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) Permitting Downward Departure for Defendants with
Significantly Reduced Mental Capacity Convicted of Nonviolent Offenses, 128 A.L.R. Fed. 593 Art.
1 § 2(a) (1995).
170. See United States v. Dillard, 975 F.2d 1554, 1555 (8th Cir. 1992). Section 5K2.0 of the
Guidelines allows a court to depart if it determines that a circumstance, although already taken into
consideration in determining the sentencing range, is present to a degree substantially in excess of
or below the typical amount for that kind of offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5K2.0(a)(3).
171. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.20.
172. Id. § 5K2.20(b).
173. Id. § 5K2.20(a). The named offenses include offenses involving a minor victim, sex
trafficking of children, and all offenses in the following chapters: Chapter 71 (Obscenity), Chapter
109A (Sexual Abuse), Chapter 110 (Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children), and
Chapter 117 (Transportation for Illegal Sexual Activity and Related Crimes). Id. See generally 18
U.S.C. §§ 1460–70 (2012) (Obscenity); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–48 (2012) (Sexual Abuse); 18 U.S.C.
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certain offense characteristics are present under the circumstances, including
serious bodily injury, death, use of a firearm, and drug trafficking. 174 Lastly, the
departure cannot apply if certain offender characteristics are present, including
criminal history level and past convictions. 175
In determining whether or not to depart under the Guidelines’ aberrant
behavior departure, a sentencing judge may consider aspects of a particular
defendant, including mental and emotion conditions, employment record, record
of prior good works, motivation for committing the offense, and efforts to
mitigate the effects of the offense. 176 In part, mental conditions are factored into
aberrant behavior departures because many mental conditions cause those
affected to be unable to perceive the consequences or likely outcome of their
actions. Logically, the inability to perceive consequences may be present in the
commission of a crime which “(1) was committed without significant planning;
(2) was of limited duration; and (3) represents a marked deviation by the
defendant from an otherwise law-abiding life.” 177 The aberrant behavior
departure allows for departure based on mental condition and indicates another
area in which the Guidelines provide for lessening in sentencing where
vulnerability and lack of moral culpability may be present.
4.

Inadequacy of Criminal History Category

Section 4A1.3, which allows for departure based on criminal history,
indicates that the Guidelines concede that a particular defendant’s criminal
history may be an inadequate indicator of either the seriousness of the
defendant’s criminal history or the defendant’s likelihood to commit other
crimes. 178 For example, a defendant who was previously sentenced under lenient
treatment but has a record with an extensive record of serious, assaultive conduct
might have the same criminal history category as a defendant with a record of
less serious conduct. 179 The inadequacy in criminal history may be remedied by
an upward departure or a downward departure, depending on if the defendant’s
criminal history is under-representative or over-representative of seriousness
and likelihood to recidivate. 180
Prohibitions on downward departure for this basis exist if the defendant is
an armed career offender or a repeat and dangerous sex offender. 181
§§ 2251–60A (2012) (Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–28
(2012) (Transportation for Illegal Sexual Activity and Related Crimes).
174. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.20(c).
175. Id.
176. Id. § 5K2.20 cmt. n.3.
177. Id. § 5K2.20(b).
178. Id. § 4A1.3.
179. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3.
180. See id.
181. Id. § 4A1.3(b)(2)(B).
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Additionally, it is prohibited to downward depart below Category I, the lowest
criminal history category. 182 However, under the Guidelines, a court can
technically depart upward from Category VI, even though Category VI is the
highest criminal history category. 183 In doing so, a court structures the departure
by moving along the sentencing table to the next higher offense level, while
staying in the Category VI column, until it reaches an appropriate guideline
range. 184
Overall, the policy behind § 4A1.3 supports the notion that sentencing
should adequately and accurately reflect the blameworthiness of the offender.
As such, if a defendant’s criminal history—which plays a vital role in
determining a sentence, especially with regard for the Terrorism
Enhancement—does not adequately and accurately reflect the offender’s
blameworthiness, a court has the means to adjust accordingly in order to reach
just punishment.
V. THE TERRORISM ENHANCEMENT IN CASES WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: UNITED
STATES V. BLAIR
A.

Facts and Outcome

In United States v. Blair, 185 the twenty-nine-year-old defendant, Alexander
Blair (“Blair”), pled guilty to conspiracy 186 after lending $100 to friend and
prospective terrorist, John Booker, Jr. (“Booker”), so that Booker could rent a
storage locker to hold what Booker believed were bomb-making materials. 187
Blair suffered from a genetic condition called Williams syndrome. 188 Blair’s
attorney, Christopher Joseph, commented that the condition made him “easily
manipulated and unable to appreciate the gravity of his conduct.” 189 In
explaining the effects of Williams syndrome, the defense expert testified that it
caused Blair to function at the level of an eleven-year-old. 190 In their statement,
the Blair family explained that Williams syndrome affects many aspects of

182. Id. § 4A1.3(b)(2)(A).
183. Id. § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B).
184. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B).
185. Criminal Complaint at 1–3, United States v. Blair, No. 5:15-cr-40031-DDC, (D. Kan. Oct.
20, 2016), ECF 1.
186. Judgment in a Criminal Case at 1, United States v. Blair, No. 5:15-cr-40031-DDC (D.
Kan. Oct. 20, 2016), ECF 61.
187. Hong, supra note 14.
188. Id.
189. United States vs. Alexander Blair Sentencing, JOSEPH, HOLLANDER, & CRAFT, LLC:
LAWYERS AND COUNSELORS (Oct. 18, 2016), https://josephhollander.com/united-states-vsalexander-blair/ [https://perma.cc/TE7L-YJ9X].
190. Id.
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physical health, mental health, and decision making. 191 The U.S. National
Library of Medicine concurs, saying that Williams syndrome affects many parts
of the body, and it also notes that affected individuals tend to take an extreme
interest in other people. 192
Going back to as early as October 2014, Booker had been communicating
his desire to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”) to a person
who, unbeknownst to Booker, was an FBI informant. 193 Booker was committed
to carrying out an act of violence in support of Jihad and even took steps to build
a bomb, planning to detonate it on the Fort Riley Military Institution. 194 Blair
first met Booker in early 2015 after he began attending the Islamic Center of
Topeka. 195 After developing a friendship, Blair became aware of Booker’s
radical beliefs and plan to commit an act of violence. 196 In March 2015, Blair
loaned Booker $100 to rent a storage unit, which Booker used for storing what
he believed to be bomb materials. 197 FBI informants, whose real motives and
alliance were still unbeknownst to Booker, worked with him to build what
Booker believed to be a workable bomb and then even accompanied him to a
place to detonate the inert device, where Booker was subsequently arrested. 198
Immediately following his arrest, FBI agents contacted and interviewed Blair. 199
In the interview, Blair explained that he did not like what Booker was doing and
made it clear to Booker that he would not personally participate—he simply
thought of his $100 loan as helping out a friend in need. 200
At trial, the Assistant U.S. Attorney urged the district court judge, Judge
Daniel D. Crabtree, to sentence Blair to five years in prison, 201 the statutory
maximum for conspiracy. 202 Contrarily, Blair’s attorney urged for Judge

191. Blair Family Statement, JOSEPH, HOLLANDER, & CRAFT, LLC: LAWYERS AND
COUNSELORS (Oct. 18, 2016), https://josephhollander.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/BlairFamily-Statement-If-Sentenced-to-Prison.pdf [https://perma.cc/76GZ-4RPL].
192. Williams Syndrome, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED.: GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Feb. 14,
2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/williams-syndrome [https://perma.cc/MRB6-CJLZ].
193. Factual Basis for Plea to Count One at 1, United States v. Blair, No. 5:15CR40031-DDC
(D. Kan. May 5, 2016), ECF 40.
194. Id. at 1–2.
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id. at 2–3.
197. Id. at 3.
198. Hong, supra note 14.
199. Factual Basis for Plea to Count One at 3, U.S. v. Blair, No. 5:1515CR40031-DDC (D.
Kan. May 5, 2016), ECF 40.
200. Id. at 7. Blair commented, in relation to Booker’s plan, “Did I like it, no, I didn’t. But, he
asked me for help, I helped him.” Id. at 5.
201. Topeka Man Sentenced for Conspiracy in Fort Riley Bomb Plot, U.S. DEP’T OF J. DIST.
KAN. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ks/pr/topeka-man-sentenced-conspiracy-fortriley-bomb-plot [https://perma.cc/5E64-CYYK].
202. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2018]

DRIFTING AWAY FROM TERRORISM

961

Crabtree to sentence Blair to probation. 203 Blair’s attorney argued that a prison
sentence would “exacerbate his developmental issues and do little to deter future
terrorist acts.” 204 Data shows that life behind bars is likely to exacerbate
conditions of the mentally ill, like Blair. 205 Additionally, conditions may
deteriorate as a result of inadequate treatment. 206 The Blair family advocated for
a non-prison sentence because “placing him in prison will expose him to a life
that could seriously harm him, take away his loving, empathetic nature and good
heart that he now possesses.” 207
In the end, Judge Crabtree sentenced Blair to fifteen months in prison,
followed by two years of supervised release. 208 Judge Crabtree struggled with
the decision, which he finally made in October 2016 after previously delaying
the sentencing twice. 209 He called it “one of the most unique, nuanced decisions”
of his career 210 because of the aspects at play—including Blair’s mental illness.
While Judge Crabtree did ultimately sentence Blair to prison, he did so with the
effect it would have on Blair in mind. In his judgment, Judge Crabtree
recommended that Blair be designated to Springfield MCFP to serve his
imprisonment, in part so that Blair could “receive the care and treatment
necessary to address the limitations and concerns raised by his mental health.” 211
After dealing with the Guidelines and the Terrorism Enhancement, Judge
Crabtree opined his displeasure with the Guidelines, calling them unfair and
claiming that they made no sense. 212 Particularly, Judge Crabtree took issue with
the criminal history aspect of the Terrorism Enhancement. 213 Although Blair
lacked any prior arrest or conviction and Judge Crabtree found that Blair did
“not represent a future danger to the community,” he still classified Blair’s
criminal history as a Category VI, the highest level, because Blair’s offense
furthered a crime of terrorism—that crime being Booker’s crime, not Blair’s
own. 214 Even though Judge Crabtree disagreed with the application of the

203. Justin Wingerter, Topekan Alexander Blair Sentenced to 15 Months in Prison for $100
Loan to John Booker Jr., TOPEKA CAP.-J., Oct. 18, 2016 (on file with author).
204. Hong, supra note 14.
205. Mentally Ill Offenders in the Criminal Justice System: An Analysis and Prescription,
SENT’G PROJECT 9 (Jan. 2002), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/
Mentally-Ill-Offenders-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B2J-UTBG].
206. Id.
207. Wingerter, supra note 203.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, U.S. v. Blair, No. 5:15CR40031-001 (D. Kan. Oct. 20,
2016), ECF 40.
212. Wingerter, supra note 203.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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Terrorism Enhancement to Blair’s criminal history, he claimed he felt obligated
to enforce it. 215
The interrelation between manipulation, Blair’s condition, and his crime
were well documented through the trial and sentencing. During sentencing,
Judge Crabtree commented on the role that Blair’s genetic condition played,
saying, “I have no doubt this condition made Mr. Blair more susceptible to Mr.
Booker’s manipulation.” 216 Blair’s lawyers contended that because Williams
syndrome results in an inability to process social cues and a compulsion to
maintain friendships, Blair was more vulnerable to manipulation from people
like Booker. 217 Regarding the connection between Blair’s condition and
Booker’s manipulation, the Blair family believed that Blair’s condition was the
only reason he committed the crime. 218 Throughout its statement, the Blair
family explained that Booker manipulated Blair throughout their friendship,
claiming that “Booker called the shots and [Blair] followed like a puppy.” 219
B.

Post-Sentencing Analysis

The Blair case exemplifies a step in the right direction toward sentencing
offenders with mental illness who play a limited role in the commission of
crimes that can fall under the Terrorism Enhancement. In sentencing Blair to
fifteen months in prison and two years of supervised release, 220 Judge Crabtree
struck a balance between the government’s desired sentence of five years in
prison and Blair’s lawyer’s plea for probation. 221 In recommending a specific
prison that he believed would get Blair the necessary treatment, 222 Judge
Crabtree also did his best to account for what was most worrisome about prison
to Blair’s family and lawyers—exacerbation of his condition. 223 He did not
diminish the importance of the rehabilitation in punishment and implemented a
character-based sentencing scheme which maintained a retributive focus in
requiring just punishment that also reflected the offender’s desert. 224 Judge
Crabtree’s sentence properly reflects the extent to which Blair was deserving of
punishment. It acknowledges the fact that Blair played a very limited role and
made it clear he would not participate further. Overall, Judge Crabtree took into

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Hong, supra note 14.
218. Blair Family Statement, supra note 191.
219. Id.
220. Wingerter, supra note 203.
221. Id.
222. Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, U.S. v. Blair, No. 5:15CR40031-001 (D. Kan. Oct. 20,
2016), ECF 61.
223. Hong, supra note 14; Wingerter, supra note 203.
224. See Hill, supra note 120, at 984.
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consideration all of the unique elements of the Blair case and tailored the
sentence appropriately.
Judge Crabtree’s criticism of the Terrorism Enhancement 225 encourages
other judges to not hide behind the ease and uniformity of the Guidelines, but
instead analyze their elements with a forward-thinking perspective—one which
accounts for the mental conditions of an offender. The complexity of the
situation could have incentivized Judge Crabtree to favor the ease and efficiency
of the Guidelines, but he did not. He took his time to contemplate how to handle
“one of the most unique, nuanced decisions” of his career. 226
While the Blair case may not shed light on the treatment of the Guidelines
overall, with regards to the Terrorism Enhancement, it illustrates that its severity
catches the eye of judges and is often met with concern. As such, even though
trends from Supreme Court cases indicate that the Guidelines are positioned as
close to law, 227 the core advisory nature of the Guidelines is not lost on judges
dealing with the Terrorism Enhancement and seeing its ability to drastically
increase a sentence. 228 That is not to say that the Guidelines are not of assistance
to sentencing judges. In some cases, such as with the Terrorism Enhancement,
being forced to consider the Guidelines first may point out alarming severity in
sentencing and, from there, work as a benchmark. 229
C. The Future for Cases with Mental Illness and the Terrorism Enhancement
In the case of the Terrorism Enhancement, especially in differentiating
between offenders with mental illness and those without, inordinate consistency
comes at too high a cost. Although terrorism is perceived as more serious than
other crimes and accordingly more deserving of more severe sentences, such a
contention cannot universally apply to the myriad of offenses which are capable
of getting caught in the sentencing wrath of the Terrorism Enhancement. At a
certain point, the punishment needs to fit more than just the crime; it needs to fit
the criminal. Currently, under the Guidelines, there is a focus on departure when
conduct does not fit the norm, but a lack of focus on when the offender does not
fit the norm.
1.

Factoring in Mental Illness to Sentencing

In the future, as mental health becomes less stigmatized, courts more and
more will be forced to consider the role it plays in the commission of crimes.
Policy initiatives are already reevaluating how offenders with mental illness
should be treated. In early 2013, then-mayor of New York City, Michael

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Wingerter, supra note 203.
Id.
Brown, Punishing Terrorists, supra note 82, at 529.
See infra Section III.B.
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
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Bloomberg, asked judges to consider the defendant’s mental health status and
prioritize treatment over prison where possible. 230 Bloomberg’s initiative came
following a report that found the mentally ill were costing New York City three
times as much as other inmates. 231 However, cost is not the only concern with
sentencing the mentally ill to prison. The susceptibility of the mentally ill to
harm in prison has also raised concerns. 232 It is well noted that individuals with
mental illness are vulnerable to victimization in the outside world, but they are
also more susceptible than people without mental illness to physical and sexual
assault in prison. 233
As a means to decrease the cost and harm of imprisonment for offenders
with mental illness, mental illness should be a required factor to consider during
sentencing. Currently, mental conditions may be taken into account if relevant,
and then, only to the extent that they are relevant. 234 The Guidelines contend that
mental conditions may be relevant if, “individually or in combination with other
offender characteristics, they are present to an unusual degree and distinguish
the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.” 235 Given that mental
illness often affects many aspects of decision making 236 and creates
vulnerability, mental illness should always be relevant in sentencing, regardless
of whether it is present to an unusual degree or not. The degree of relevancy will
likely change for each offender and each circumstance, however, in any case, its
relevancy will always be a basis to warrant consideration of mental illness as a
factor in sentencing. The vulnerability resulting from mental illness needs to
factor into the severity of a contemplated sentence to ensure that an offender is
not over-punished 237 and has the opportunity for rehabilitation.
In considering mental illness in sentencing, judges may look to other
provisions of the Guidelines that account for and allow departures for mental
conditions, mental capacity, and moral culpability, such as the provisions for
vulnerable victims, diminished capacity, and aberrant behavior. 238 These
230. Editorial Board, Treatment, Not Jail, for the Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/opinion/treatment-not-jail-for-the-mentally-ill-in-new-yorkcity.html?_r=2& [https://perma.cc/36G4-PA32].
231. Id.
232. E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental
Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 150–51 (2013).
233. Id. at 151.
234. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(4) (2012) (emphasis added).
235. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
236. See Ricardo Cáceda, Charles B. Nemereoff & Philip D. Harvey, Toward an Understanding
of Decision Making in Severe Mental Illness, 26 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL
NEUROSCIENCES 196, 196 (2014) (“Arguably, the greatest functional impact of these illnesses on
the lives of the mentally ill and society are not related to the symptoms of delusions, hallucinations,
or depressed mood, but simply to making poor decisions.”).
237. Johnston, supra note 232, at 151.
238. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3.
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provisions are based on a lack of blameworthiness because of a lack of
understanding of the situation or consequences of the conduct involved. 239 The
same policy supports considering mental illness in sentencing. Consideration of
mental illness is not a guarantee for departure, but it opens the doors for
departure. Opportunity for departure is much needed, and thus should be
required, when sentences have opportunity for severe enhancement, as with the
Terrorism Enhancement.
2.

Departing Based on a Mentally Ill Offenders’ Role in an Offense

Currently, under the Guidelines, a defendant’s role in an offense cannot be
a basis for departing from a particular guideline range. 240 In the context of the
Terrorism Enhancement and offenders with mental illness, this is particularly
troublesome. A severe sentence can be placed on an offender whose
vulnerability was exploited, and even if the offender played a small role in an
offense, it is irrelevant.
In Booker, the Court explained that the intended uniformity of the
Guidelines was not merely in similar sentences for those convicted of violations
of the same statute, but rather should emanate with similar relationships between
sentences and real conduct. 241 In the context of the over-encompassing grasp of
the Terrorism Enhancement, the harmfulness of conduct or the blameworthiness
of a particular defendant who has mental health issues is more important than
the fact that the offense can fall under the wide net cast by the vague definition
of a “federal crime of terrorism.” The “real conduct,” including the role of the
offender, should play a bigger role in sentencing than the implicated statute.
People with mental illness carry the burden of a dangerous risk of being
exploited, even slightly, for the commission of a crime. Following this, in the
context of the Terrorism Enhancement, offenders with mental illness run the risk
of having such exploitation lead to a severe sentence for a crime stretched to
meet the vague definition of a federal crime of terrorism. To mitigate these risks,
the role of an offender with mental illness should be available as a means for
departure.
In particular, if a defendant suffering from mental illness is found to have
been a “vulnerable victim” of another, making the defendant a vulnerable
offender in committing the offense, there should be an opportunity for downward
departure. In the Guidelines’ definition of “vulnerable victim,” the victim must
be unusually vulnerable “due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is
otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” 242 People with
mental illness are unusually vulnerable under this standard.

239.
240.
241.
242.

Johnston, supra note 232, at 185.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.7.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253–54 (2005).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b) cmt. 2.
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In the definition provided of a vulnerable victim, the Guidelines
acknowledge that mental conditions result in unusual vulnerability which makes
a person particularly susceptible to criminal conduct. 243 This holds true
regardless of whether the person is a victim of a crime or an offender; the
situation of the person may change, but the effect of his or her mental condition
does not. Even as an offender, mental conditions create a special degree of
vulnerability which often leads to manipulation. The vulnerability associated
with people afflicted with mental conditions can lead them to be targeted not
only as victims, but also as accomplices or conspirators. However, the
Guidelines only provide a possible enhancement to account for the former, 244
but no such reciprocal downward adjustment to account for the latter. When an
offender afflicted with mental illness is vulnerable and another offender preys
on this vulnerability to involve the mentally ill offender in his or her offense,
particularly when the role is minor, there needs to be room for downward
departure.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Guidelines are evolutionary in nature, 245 and reflect, “congressional
awareness that sentencing is a dynamic field that requires continuing review.” 246
The Guidelines, in their current state, require review and adaptation. Public
concern about terrorism is reflected in the severity of the Terrorism
Enhancement, but it drastically overstates the reality of the threat of terrorism in
America. Accordingly, the Terrorism Enhancement has been built to be broad
and vague enough to combat this fear with severe sentencing for almost any
crime. In many cases, the Terrorism Enhancement drastically overstates fair and
necessary punishment for defendants and their conduct. Although this is
generally concerning, it is particularly concerning for offenders with mental
illness because they have the propensity to struggle with decision making and
lack a full understanding of the situation and its consequences.
There’s an elephant in the room: no one wants to appear weak on
terrorism. 247 However, in recognizing the reality of terrorism and moving toward
managing, rather than defeating, 248 it, judges need to appropriately consider an
243. Id.
244. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1.
245. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 2.
246. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2.
247. See, e.g., BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM (1998), (“On one point, at least, everyone
agrees: terrorism is a pejorative term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is
generally applied to one’s enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would
otherwise prefer to ignore.”), http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/h/hoffman-terrorism.html
[https://perma.cc/88ZZ-7STW].
248. Rosa Brooks, The Threat Is Already Inside, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 20, 2015),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/20/the-threat-is-already-inside-uncomfortable-truths-terrorism-
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offender’s mental illness in sentencing. The Blair case presents an example for
properly factoring mental illness into sentencing in that it accounts for treatment
and rehabilitation and departed both from the Terrorism Enhancement and the
statutory maximum for the offense. At the outset, one specific purpose of the
Commission was to develop sentences that reflect advancement in knowledge
of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process. 249 Advancements
in knowledge of human behavior have led to the conclusion that mental illness
creates susceptibility to harm and vulnerability to manipulation. The
Commission needs to create sentences to reflect this conclusion. In the
meantime, courts have the ability to rectify the risks of harm, vulnerability, and
manipulation that mental illness causes, both in the real world and in prison, but
they cannot do so without considering mental illness as a factor in sentencing.
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Rita v. United States, “[t]he
Commission’s work is ongoing.” 250 Any work not done yet is left in the hands
of the court, which, after Booker, is armed with the discretion to make a
difference—the discretion to combat unrealistic public fears of terrorism, to
adequately address the stigma of mental illness, and to accurately account for
unique aspects of conduct that come with it. It is left to the courts to use this
discretion to consider mental illness in sentencing and when sentencing a
defendant with mental illness, whose vulnerability was exploited by another in
committing the offense, depart downward from the possibly severe results of the
Terrorism Enhancement.
MELISSA POWERS *

isis/ [https://perma.cc/4YAH-DKNT] (“If we want to reduce the long-term risk of terrorism—and
reduce its ability to twist Western societies into unrecognizable caricatures of themselves—we need
to stop viewing terrorism as shocking and aberrational, and instead recognize it as an ongoing
problem to be managed, rather than ‘defeated.’”).
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